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Titling at Windmills: Reparations and the International Criminal Court 
1. Introduction 
Reparations for international crimes seem quixotic given the harm caused and the multitude of 
victims, making them difficult to place within the frameworks of international criminal 
tribunals.1 Judges at ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were unable to 
award reparations,2 instead they recommended it should be delivered through an international 
claims commission that never materialised.3 In the early drafts of the ICC Statute there were 
concerns that including reparations would be too complex due to the scale of victimisation.4 
States were also reluctant to include state responsibility within the statute, as it could detract 
from individual criminal responsibility. 5  Instead delegates recognised that victims of 
international crimes have a right to reparation against the convicted person, but acknowledged 
that this cannot be ‘interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or 
international law.’6  However this has caused down-river consequences at the ICC, where 
reparations can only be ordered against convicted persons, most of whom are indigent. 
This article contributes to the literature on how to improve the work of the ICC on 
reparations,7 reflecting on the past, present and future role of reparations within the Court 
bearing in mind the comparative practice, and adopting a more holistic approach to reparations 
that builds on the concept of reparative complementarity. To this end, the article begins by 
 
1 Article 28 provided for restitution, but was never ordered. See L. Moffett, ‘The Role of Victims in the 
International Criminal Tribunals of the Second World War’, (2012) 12 ICLR  245-270, 256. 
2 Under Rule 106 of both Tribunals the Registrar could transmit a judgment of a conviction to national 
authorities that victims could use as a claim before a domestic body. 
3  Letter dated 12 October 2000 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2000/1063, 3 November 2000; Letter dated 9 
November 2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the 
Secretary-General, S/2000/1198, 15 December 2000. 
4 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session, 4 May to 24 July 1992, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, 47th session, Supplement No.10, paras.88–92. 
5 C. Muttukumaru, ‘Reparations to Victims’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The 
Making of the Rome Statute; Issues, Negotiations, Results, (1999), 262 at 268; and F. McKay, ‘Are 
Reparations Appropriately Addressed in the ICC Statute?’, in D. Shelton (ed.), International Crimes, 
Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court, (2000), 163 at 167. 
6 Rome Statute, Article 75(6). 
7  For example, M. Cohen, Realizing Reparative Justice for International Crimes: From Theory to 
Practice, (2020); L. Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court, (2014); C. 
McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court, (2014). 
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outlining the evolving jurisprudence of reparations at the ICC, paying particular attention to the 
Court’s determinations on three areas of contention: criminal responsibility; victimhood; and 
reparation measures. It then considers the role of the Trust Fund for Victims in operationalising 
reparations. The last section of this article considers the future of the Court’s reparation process, 
examining the issues of security, funding and the work of the Trust Fund, a tripartite breakdown 
of concerns constraining the work of the Court today. It critically situates these issues in light 
of the broader theoretical concern of reparative justice at the ICC as a set of responses on 
reparation including domestic practice where the Court has jurisdiction, to enhance the 
fulfilment of this right for victims of international crimes. This is a natural consequence of 
reparative complementarity, but it is also the way forward in concretising reparations for 
victims before the ICC.  
2. Emerging Jurisprudence on Reparations at the ICC 
More than twenty years after the adoption of the Rome Statute, the jurisprudence of the Court 
on reparation remains underdeveloped. At the time of writing this article, only four judgments 
on reparation have been handed down, with limited implementation. 8  Expectations about 
reparation for international crimes nevertheless remain high. This has not been abated by the 
information and at times rhetoric of Court officials about ensuring ‘justice for victims of 
international crimes.’9 While the ICC has been slow to respond to its mandate on reparations, 
other courts, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have crafted ground-breaking 
procedural and substantive principles of reparation that have been translated into 
comprehensive orders on reparations.10 Even other tribunals, like the European Court of Human 
Rights, certainly more restrained on adjudication on reparations than the Inter-American 
 
8 The latest is The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Reparations Order, ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, 8 March 
2021. 
9 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, para.15. 
10 J. Cavallaro, C. Vargas, C. Sandoval and B. Duhaime, Doctrine, Practice and Advocacy in the Inter-
American Human Rights System (2019), chapter 15.  
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counterpart, have also refined their approach to reparations by ordering, in some cases, ‘general 
measures’ and forms of restitution beyond compensation.11  
Reparations alongside provisions for victim participation are two of the landmark 
provisions of the Rome Statute, indicating victim-orientated justice, with some going as far as 
to say that it constitutes a restorative turn in international criminal justice adjudication.12 
Despite drawing from international human rights law,13 the exclusion of state responsibility and 
the focus on compensation, restitution and rehabilitation within the language of the Rome 
Statute, indicates, as Sperfeldt points out, a selective borrowing of the right to reparation 
developed in human rights law. 14  The Court’s reparation jurisprudence has been slow to 
develop with some of its core principles and essential requirements in awarding reparations 
only clarified through the 2015 Appeals Chamber decision15 and order on minimum elements 
for reparations in the Lubanga case.16 While these principles were not intended to be binding 
on other trial chambers adjudicating on reparations, but instead they meant to be adapted or 
expanded upon,17 they have become entrenched as they were followed in the Katanga and Al 
Mahdi cases.18 Only in the Ntaganda case were they expanded.19 While there have been some 
innovations in these subsequent cases, the Lubanga reparation principles have very much 
framed the development of reparations at the Court. 
 
11 A. Donald and A. Speck, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Remedial Practice and its Impact on 
the Execution of Judgments,’ (2019)19(1) HRLR 19(1), 83. 
12 Muttukumaru, supra note 5, at 264. 
13 McKay, supra note 5, at 166. 
14 C. Sperfeldt, ‘Rome’s Legacy: Negotiating the Reparations Mandate of the International Criminal 
Court,’ (2017) 17(2) ICLR 351, at 373. 
15 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, 3 
March 2015, para.38. 
16 Ibid., para.31. 
17 Ibid., para.55. 
18 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/07-3728, 24 March 2017, paras.29-30, and Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Reparations 
order, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, 17 August 2017, para.26. 
19 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.41-67. 
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The Lubanga principles draw from the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation20 as well as the reparation jurisprudence of the Inter-American and 
European Courts of Human Rights. The UN Basic Principles provides, ‘clarity about the right 
to a remedy and reparation,’21 but little content on how to successfully achieve ‘adequate, 
prompt and effective’ reparation in the face of scarce resources. The Lubanga principles set out 
a more implementation focused basis for reparations at the Court, including the scope of 
beneficiaries, dignity and non-discrimination, consultation, modalities of reparations, the rights 
of the defence and obligations of other actors. Some of these principles such as non-
stigmatisation, are not usually found in other reparation guidelines or judgments. Instead, they 
reflect, for example, the 2007 Paris Principles on Child Soldiers,22 exhibiting the particular facts 
of the Lubanga case. This may bring out interesting jurisprudence in the future regarding the 
treatment of victims of conflict-related sexual violence in trying to minimise stigma. The ICC 
has so far established the general foundation to reparations, but much more can be built upon 
to make it effective. 
 Importantly, despite the fact that reparation orders at the ICC have tried to borrow from 
human rights law, they are framed in narrower terms. At the ICC, reparations can be ordered 
against the convicted person, for the extent of his/her criminal liability, and to those that are 
recognised as victims by the Court.23 This contrasts to human rights courts where reparation is 
awarded against the State and is focused on remedying proven victims’ harm,24 even in the 
absence of an investigation/prosecution of the individual perpetrator(s) responsible for the 
violations. Something similar happens in the context of transitional justice practice when 
 
20 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005. 
21 C. Sandoval, ‘The Legal Standing and Significance of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation’, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict: Impulses from the Max Planck 
Trialogues, (2018)78(3) HJIL 565, at 568. 
22  2007 UNICEF Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups. 
23 Lubanga, supra note 15, para.69; Lubanga, Order for reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, 3 
March 2015, para.2; and Al Mahdi, Reparations order, supra note 18, para.27. 
24 See Velásquez Rodríquez v. Honduras, 21 July 1989, reparations and costs, IACtHR, Series C No.7, 
para.134; Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia, 31 January 2006, merits, reparations and costs, IACtHR, 
Series C No.140, paras.91, 112, and 122. 
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domestic reparation programmes are set up by States to deal in a flexible evidentiary manner 
and in a prompt way with the various harms suffered by thousands to even millions of victims 
that qualify as beneficiaries.25 The narrowness of the criminal proceedings when it comes to 
reparations has a direct impact on the consideration of harm and forms of reparation that the 
ICC could order. Here we would like to focus on three key issues arising in the Court’s 
emerging reparation jurisprudence: criminal responsibility; victimhood; and reparation 
measures. 
2.1. Criminal Responsibility 
Under Article 75(2) the Court can make a reparations order ‘directly against a convicted 
person’. This, according to the Appeals Chamber in the case of Lubanga, means that ‘the 
reparations order must not go beyond the crimes for which [the perpetrator] was convicted.’26 
The difficulty with this approach is the asymmetry between the individual convicted person 
and the hundreds and thousands of victims with potential claims for reparation. This asymmetry 
is augmented when the Court goes after one individual or a few of them, who have allegedly 
committed the most serious crimes that denote the existence of an armed group or a criminal 
organisation.27  However, as these groups are not themselves subject to trial, the scope of 
liability and therefore of reparation is severely limited. This is apparent in the Lubanga and 
Ntaganda cases, where two members of the Ituri UPC/FPLC militia were before the Court, but 
a number of charges were excluded during the trial against Lubanga, and Ntaganda was not 
prosecuted for alleged crimes his organisation committed in North Kivu.28 That said the Court 
did hold both of them jointly liable for recruiting and using child soldiers.29 
 
25 P. Van der Auweraert, The Potential for Redress: Reparations and Large-Scale Displacement, in R. 
Duthie (ed.), Transitional Justice and Displacement, ICTJ (2012), 139, at 140. 
26 Lubanga, on the appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations 
Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 A7 A8, 18 July 2019, para.3. See also the 
dissent by Judge Eboe-Osuji where he claims that ‘reparation under the Statute need not depend entirely 
on conviction.’ para.15. 
27 N. Tapia Navarro, ‘Collective reparations and the limitations of International Criminal Justice to 
Respond to Mass Atrocity,’ (2018)18(1), ICLR, 67-96. 
28 Unfinished Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, HRW, September 2011; and Public 
redacted version of “Prosecution’s Closing Brief”, 20 April 2018, ICC-01/04-02/06-2277-Anx1-Corr-
Red, 7 November 2018, paras.841-850. 
29 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.219-221. 
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Reparations are unlikely to contribute to broader goals of reconciliation or 
transformation, where only one or a handful of perpetrator(s), from one-side, or at a particular 
point in time of a conflict are found responsible. The ICC is necessarily selective and 
exemplary, in that it cannot prosecute all perpetrators, but concentrates its efforts on those most 
responsible, providing a myopic narrative of violence. This leaves little comfort for victims 
who expect international justice to work on their behalf, given the inability or unwillingness of 
domestic systems to ensure justice, including reparations for the harm they have suffered. The 
focus on individual perpetrators also limits the extent of their financial liability to the extent of 
their criminal responsibility for the crimes of which they are found to be guilty. So far all 
convicted persons before the ICC have been indigent. Initially the Trial Chamber in Lubanga 
believed that such indigence meant that reparations could not be awarded against Mr Lubanga. 
This has since changed by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga case, and followed in subsequent 
cases, where the Court held that indigence does not affect a convicted person’s liability.30  
The 2015 Lubanga appeals decision also set down the principle that liability for 
reparations should be proportionate to harm caused and, inter alia, to the person's participation 
in the commission of crimes.31 Other Chambers have nevertheless not always followed this 
position, which upholds joint liability. In Lubanga the judges found that regardless of the 
degree of a perpetrator’s participation in a crime, ‘no single co-perpetrator bears all of the 
liability for the crimes committed.’32  Whereas the Appeals Chamber in the Katanga case 
deemed that it is ‘not, per se, inappropriate to hold the person liable for the full amount 
necessary to repair the harm.’33 In a more recent Appeals Chamber decision on Mr Lubanga’s 
liability, the Chamber considered that liability could be mitigated by the convicted person 
 
30 Lubanga, Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is 
Liable, ICC-01/04-01/06-3379-Red-tENG, para.269; Katanga, supra note 18, para.246; Al Mahdi, supra 
note 18, para.114; and ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, para.223. 
31 Lubanga, supra 15, para.118. 
32 Lubanga, Appeal Brief of the Defence for Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the ‘Décision fixant le 
montant des reparations auxquelles ~Thomas Lubanga Dyilo est tenu’ ICC-01/04-01/06-3394-Red-
tENG, 15 March 2018, paras.230 and 234. 
33 Katanga, Judgment on the appeals against the order of Trial Chamber II of 24 March 2017 entitled 
‘order for reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute,’ ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, 9 March 2018, 
para.178. 
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where they can show their contribution to reduce the harm caused to victims, such as having 
helped to demobilise child soldiers, ‘especially those assessed as samples by the Trial 
Chamber’.34 
The liability cost for reparations is rising as the Court is concluding more complex 
cases with thousands of victims. In December 2017 the Trial Chamber set Mr Lubanga’s 
liability to $10,000,000 and included not only the 425 identified victims before the Court, but 
also around 3,000 non-identified victims.35 In 2021 Mr Ntaganda, Mr Lubanga’s subordinate, 
who was convicted of 18 crimes had his financial liability set at $30,000,000 reflecting the cost 
of repair for the harm caused to at least 3,500 direct victims.36 In Katanga the defence tried to 
argue that given his lower liability of aiding and abetting he should have a more reasonable, 
nominal share of financial liability (set at $1,000,000) with the Trust Fund having a greater 
share of the $3,752,620 award.37 This was rejected by the Appeals Chamber.38  
 The financial liability of the perpetrator needs to be critically interrogated for the 
finality of reparation claims, seizing and freezing assets and securing implementation of what 
is ordered. In the Al Mahdi case the Chamber recognised that the financial circumstances of the 
perpetrator affect implementation, such as paying compensation in instalments, but it did not 
want to ‘impose hardships’ on Mr Al Mahdi that would ‘make it impossible for him to 
reintegrate into society upon his release.’39 This was in response to the defence’s submission 
that his liability should end once he had served his nine-year sentence. Yet this heightens 
tensions around the balance between the convicted person’s rights and his or her obligations to 
victims, where the reintegration of the defendant is a consideration for sentencing and early 
release. The issue remains within the competence of the Presidency to monitor once a defendant 
is released, but it would require state cooperation and some effort to oversee the financial 
 
34  Lubanga, Judgment on the appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size if the 
Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable,’ ICC-01/04-01/06-3466-Red, 18 July 
2019, para.311. 
35 Lubanga supra note 28, paras.279-281. 
36 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.245-247. 
37 Katanga, Defence Document in Support of Appeal against the Reparations Order, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3747-Red, 29 June 2017, paras.84 and 85. 
38 Katanga, supra note 33, paras.178-186. 
39 Al Mahdi, supra note 18, para.114. 
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situation of such individuals. Furthermore, there has been little thought on how the Court and 
states will oversee and enforce reparation orders against convicted persons once they are 
released. Do they confiscate any earnings they have, disincentivising them from officially 
declaring any job they have? Do they take a percentage contribution from their income to be 
used towards the reparation debt they have at the ICC, allowing them to provide for themselves 
and their family, or for the matter to be dropped entirely, given the likely costs in monitoring 
and enforcement? Would remunerated work in detention be able to be transferred to victims? 
The Court has yet to address the long-term implementation and implications of reparations. 
The issue of identifying and seizing assets of the perpetrator is central in ensuring that 
there are sufficient financial resources available to provide meaningful and adequate redress to 
victims. 40  Unfortunately, the work done by the Court, and the international cooperation 
provided by States Parties, has been grossly inadequate. This was evident in the Bemba case 
where his shares in a Congolese beer company were not frozen,41 and one of his jets was left to 
rot on a runway in Faro to the extent that the parking ticket on it was over €980,000, the keys 
were lost and the plane was only good for scrap.42 Following his acquittal, Mr Bemba has faced 
ongoing difficulties for such assets to be unfrozen.43  
More reflection is needed at the Court in striking a balance between the scope of 
liability of the perpetrator and victims’ right to reparation. Victims might have received some 
reparative benefits from other sources since they were harmed including any help or support 
provided to them by other actors aimed at wiping out damage. In the case of Al Mahdi where 
UNESCO repaired the damage caused to the mausoleums in Timbuktu, the Court held that such 
efforts do not alter the harm caused or the liability of the convicted person.44 In Bemba, the 
 
40  At the ECCC see Rachel Killean and Luke Moffett, What’s In a Name? ‘Reparations’ at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
21(1)(2021). 
41 Bemba, Defence Submissions on Sentence, ICC-01/05-01/08-3376-Red, 26 April 2016, fn.232; and 
O. van Beemen, De Heineken-connectie van Strafhof-verdachte Bemba, Vrij Nederland, 21 March 2016. 
See also The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the implementation of the request to 
freeze assets, ICC-01/09-02/11-931, 8 July 2014. 
42 Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages, ICC-01/05-01/08-3673-Red2, 19 March 2019, 
paras.130-132. 
43 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3655-Red, 24 August 2018. 
44 Al-Mahdi, supra note 23, para.65. 
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defence asked that ‘victims disclose all cumulative benefits they received from third parties, be 
it the State or international organisations, since the moment they were harmed’,45 with the aim 
to reduce such benefits from any potential order against Mr. Bemba.  
We are not arguing that the Court has aimed to limit reparation as much as possible, 
but rather to note the tension that exists in its existential crisis in ensuring fair trials for 
suspected perpetrators and offer vindication and remedy for victims.46 While some Chambers 
would want to acknowledge the centrality of the right to reparation that victims have, the issue 
is not settled in the jurisprudence of the Court. Part of the problem is the criminal law mentality 
that continues to apply in the consideration of reparations at the ICC and the lack of a standard 
of effectiveness as used in human rights law.47 The practice of the ICC on the scope of liability 
of the convicted person is narrowly conceived compared to States in international human rights 
adjudication or transitional justice programmes. Indeed, under international human rights law, 
a State’s obligation to ensure reparations for all harm caused as a result of human rights 
violations whether by private or public actors.48 In transitional justice practice individuals have 
been held liable along with the State, obliging both to fulfil reparation, given the scale and 
seriousness of the violations.49 The ability to pay is often not factors in such decisions. 
Human rights law and transitional justice also struggle with reparation implementation, 
partly due to the scarcity of resources and/or the lack of will to comply with what has been 
ordered.50 Furthermore, as international practice on reparations continue to develop, a lack of 
resources and the prospects of implementation, are having an impact on the orders given by 
 
45 Bemba, supra note 42, para.242. 
46 A. Balta, M. Bax and R. Letschert, Trial and (Potential) Error: Conflicting Visions on Reparations 
Within the ICC System, 29(3)(2019) ICLR 222, at 227. 
47  Lubanga, Separate Opinion of Judge Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza, ICC-01/04-01/06-3466-AnxII, 
16 September 2019, para.35. See Ferstman (2019). 
48 See UN Basic Principles, paras.15-16. 
49  Molina Theissen case, C-01077-1998-00002 de.1ro. Tribunal Primero De Sentencia Penal, 
Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra El Ambiente De Mayor Riesgo Grupo “C”, Guatemala, 3 May 2018; 
and Teresa Jiménez López, 2 December 2010, paras. 440-452, available at: 
https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Sentencia-Jorge-Iv%C3%A1n-
Laverde-Zapata-2010.pdf 
50 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of non-recurrence, 
A/69/518, 14 October 2014, para.6 and C. Devos and D. Baluarte, From Judgment to Justice: 
Implementing International and Regional Human Rights Decisions, (2010), at 10. 
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regional human rights courts which, for example, are awarding financial compensation against 
States in light of its financial situation.51 This financial feasibility can also have an impact on 
the scope of victimhood. 
2.2 Victimhood 
While the ICC Rules elaborates a wide concept of victimhood,52 who is considered to be an 
eligible victim for reparations and for what harms, remains a key source of contention at the 
ICC. Eligibility for reparations requires that victims must have suffered personal harm as a 
result of the crime that the defendant has been convicted of and which fall within the defined 
locations and dates specified by the Court.53 Generally reparations have been focused on direct 
victims as those who suffer harm themselves, and sufficiently close family members, often 
referred as indirect victims, taking a contextual approach to understanding ‘family’.54 This 
distinction reflections that direct victims need a ‘causal link must exist between the harm 
suffered and the crimes of which an accused is found guilty’ whereas indirect victims suffer 
loss, injury or damage due to their ‘relationship’ to the direct victim.55 Legal entities can also 
be recognised as victims, including schools (Lubanga), hospitals (Ntaganda), companies or 
international organisations (Al Mahdi).56 The scope of eligible victims can vary between cases 
due to their circumstances.57 
In determining whether someone is a victim in relation to a crime, causation must be 
shown as a ‘but-for relationship’ between the harm and the crime, which must be a proximate 
cause of the harm.58 A proximate cause is limited to those acts that ‘are closely connected to 
 
51 C. Sandoval, ‘Two steps forward, one step back: Reflections on the jurisprudential turn of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on domestic reparation programmes’ (2018)22(9) IJHR, 1192-1208; 
V.  Fikfak, ‘Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human Rights,’ (2019) 
29(4) EJIL, 1091-1125. 
52 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 85. 
53 Lubanga, supra note 18, para.32; Lubanga, supra note 23, paras.54 and 56; Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3728, 24 March 2017, paras.38-40; and Al-Mahdi, supra note 21, para.42. 
54 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728, 24 March 2017, paras.113 and 121. 
55 Ibid.; and Lubanga, Decision on Indirect Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, paras.47 and 49. 
56 Rule 85(b); and Lubanga, supra note 23, para.8. 
57 Lubanga, supra note 26, para.80; and Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728, para.38. 
58 Lubanga, ibid., para.162. 
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the result of that act and that are significant enough to justify a finding of liability.’59 In the 
Katanga case, the victims’ legal representatives tried to argue that children born after the 
massacre should have access to collective rehabilitative psychological services, given the 
transmission of transgenerational trauma of parents to children.60 However the Court rejected 
this on the ground that it lacked a proximate connection to the massacre on the 24th February 
2003.61 The consequence is that the universe of victims is smaller for the ICC. This contrasts 
with the jurisprudence of other tribunals, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
which has recognised that even children who are posthumously born have a right to reparation, 
they can suffer material and psychological harm, and are eligible for different forms of 
reparation including compensation and rehabilitation.62 The Chamber in the Ntaganda case 
nuanced this approach by recognising that children born as a result of rape and sexual violence 
should be considered as direct, rather than indirect, victims given the ‘particular harm’ they 
suffer.63 However other children of victims of rape or sexual slavery not born as a result of the 
crime would be considered indirect victims. This is a reasonable distinction, given the 
additional stigma children born as a result of rape face. 
 Victim eligibility at the ICC has not only been based on the idea that individuals have 
rights, but also that there might be a collective entitlement to reparation. In identifying what 
constitutes a group of victims for collective reparations, Trial Chamber II in the Katanga case 
set down that,  
a group or category of persons may be bound by a shared identity or experience, but 
also by victimization by dint of the same violation or the same crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Collective reparations may, therefore, benefit a group, 
including an ethnic, racial, social, political or religious group which predated the crime, 
but also any other group bound by collective harm and suffering as a consequence of 
the crimes of the convicted person.64  
 
 
59 Katanga, Decision on the Matter of the Transgenerational Harm Alleged by Some Applicants for 
Reparations Remanded by the Appeals Chamber in its Judgment of 8 March 2018, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3804-Red-tENG, 19 July 2018, para.16. 
60 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3788-Conf, 16 April 2018. 
61 Katanga, supra note 59, paras.29-31. 
62 Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, IACtHR, Series C No.136, 22 November 
2005, para.119. 
63 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.121-123. 
64 Katanga, supra note 27, para.275. 
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This is in line with international human rights law and transitional justice practice, all of which 
not only recognise the cultural community link that certain victims have, but also that there 
might be other grounds to claim collective reparation such as the particular harm suffered. 
Indeed, the Inter-American Court has awarded collective reparation not only in cases involving 
indigenous groups,65  but also in other cases where such a cultural link did not exist, but 
experienced similar mass atrocities.66  This has been followed in other transitional justice 
contexts. In Morocco for example, the idea of collective reparation intended to remedy 
collective punishment of communities in terms of economic deprivation and a lack of 
development.67  
It is not surprising that different bodies are engaging with collective reparations and 
trying to frame them widely, given the lack of resources and the complex challenges in 
identifying and delivering reparations to victims. Indeed, a community-based approach was 
proposed by the TFV and other participants in the Lubanga case and accepted by the Trial 
Chamber in the first instance, as a way to broaden the benefits and utility of reparations beyond 
individual awards, as well as to minimise costly verification procedures. 68  However 
community-based reparations would allow those who perpetrated and supported the 
recruitment and conscription of child soldiers to benefit.69 The Appeals Chamber rejected this 
broad interpretation of community-based reparations, re-affirming that reparation can be 
individual and collective, and requiring that reparations be awarded against a person for the 
crimes of which he/she was convicted.70 In the Al Mahdi case the community of Timbuktu was 
recognised as an eligible group of victims for the purposes of collective reparations. The 
Chamber also acknowledged that Mali and the international community suffered harm as a 
 
65 Saramaka v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, IACtHR, Series 
C 172, 28 November 2007, paras.188-189. 
66 Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs, IACtHR, Series C.148, 1 July 
2006, paras.354 and 397. 
67 ICTJ, Rapport de la Conférence de Rabat, Le Concept et Les Défis Des Réparations Collectives, 
February 2009, at 29. 
68  Lubanga, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2904, 7 August 2012, para.274. 
69 Lubanga, Observations on the Sentence and Reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2864-tENG, 18 April 
2012, para.16.  
70 Lubanga, supra note 26, para.214. 
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result of the destruction of the UNESCO World Heritage site in Timbuktu, awarding each a 
symbolic €1 each. 71  That said the community in Timbuktu, has a cultural and spiritual 
connection to the site, as recognised as the primary victim and prioritised in reparations to 
maximise its effects.72  
Being identified as a victim eligible for reparations depends on various issues beyond 
charges and the conviction of the perpetrator even if these are essential. In most cases victims 
have to apply for reparation at the Court to be eligible.73 This is not an easy process particularly 
in the types of cases of which the Court is exercising jurisdiction on, where there is insecurity 
or the presence of the Court or of intermediaries are not permanent. In the Lubanga case, while 
the Appeals Chamber has held that ‘reparations need to be responsive to the operational reality 
in which they take place’,74 victims have strongly contested the need for the defence to screen 
their applications, given that the rules suggest that this only has to be done in individual claims 
for reparations.75 This responsibility of the Court to protect the rights of the convicted person 
against false claims has discouraged victims from coming forward to engage with collective 
reparation programmes out of fear for their own safety.76 Ullrich has termed this the ‘blame 
cascade’ where victims continue to be marginalised even in reparation processes. 77  Thus 
victims are treated with mistrust, but unlike other reparation processes the Court has to balance 
the rights of the convicted person against victims who can benefit from a reparation order 
against them. 
 
71 Al Mahdi, supra note 30, para.53 and 106-107. 
72 Ibid., para.55. 
73 For symbolic reparations this is not necessary – Lubanga, Order approving the proposed plan of the 
Trust Fund for Victims in relation to symbolic collective reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-3251, 21 October 
2016. 
74 Lubanga, Redaction of Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-
Red, 3 November 2015, para.15. 
75 Réponse des Représentants des Victimes aux Observations de la Défense à la Première Transmission 
des Formulaires de Réparation Expurgés du 8 mars 2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3296, 24 April 2017, para. 
17. 
76 Lubanga, Réponse des Représentants des Victimes aux Observations de la Défense à la Première 
Transmission des Formulaires de Réparation Expurgés du 8 mars 2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3296, 24 April 
2017, para.25. 
77 Leila Ullrich, The (Un-)making of “Justice for Victims” at the International Criminal Court’, Oxford 
University Press, (2021). 
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The Bemba case illustrates some of these challenges. The ICC received 5,760 
applications for participation and/or reparation, 5,229 of individuals were eligible to participate 
at trial.78 Approximately 3,700 victims also requested reparation.79 Up to 5,000 did not have 
sufficient documentation and many did not fill an application due to misunderstanding or being 
displaced.80 Moreover, it is difficult for some victims to understand why certain people were 
included and others excluded from reparations. This reflects the complexity of trying to fulfil 
the right to reparation through a criminal trial, which is necessarily limited at the ICC with its 
strict temporal, subject-matter, personal and territorial jurisdiction. Victims and civil society 
have on a number of occasions challenged the confines of the charges against accused persons, 
given their implications for reparations, from broadening the charges against Mr Lubanga 
beyond child soldiers,81 crimes committed by Bemba’s troops in the DRC,82 and gender based 
violence in the Al Mahdi case,83 with little success. That said, the Court in the Lubanga case at 
least encouraged the Trust Fund to consider using its assistance mandate to offer services to 
victims of sexual and gender based violence, given that Mr Lubanga was not convicted of this 
crime.84 Who is considered an eligible victim has also shaped the scope of reparation measures 
that the ICC can deliver. 
2.3 Reparation Measures 
The ICC has categorised reparations into individual and collective measures. 85 The Rome 
Statute refers to three modalities of reparation - restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.86 
 
78 Bemba, ICC-01/05- 01/08-3575-Conf, paras.29-30. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. para.41-42.  
81 Lubanga, Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims of the Implementation of the 
Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-1891-tENG, 22 May 
2009. 
82 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Demande du représentant légal de VPRS 3 et 6 
aux fins de mise en cause de Monsieur Jean-Pierre Bemba en sa qualité de chef militaire au sens de 
l’article 28-a du Statut pour les crimes dont ses troupes sont présumées coupables en Ituri, ICC-01/04-
564, 28 June 2010. 
83 FIDH, Unheard, Unaccounted: Towards Accountability for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence at the 
ICC and Beyond, (2015), at 25. 
84 Lubanga, supra note 15, para.64. 
85 Lubanga, supra note 15, paras.41-67 and 222-236. 
86 Article 75 (1). The Rome Statute itself only speaks of ‘including’ restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation, though the Court’s Rules speak of individual and collective measures, see also Rule 97(1). 
 15 
The Court has also recognised that ‘other types of reparations, for instance those with a 
symbolic, preventative or transformative value, may also be appropriate’.87  The Court has 
discretion on whether or not to order reparations, on an individual or collective basis or both.88 
This approach to forms of reparation creates an opportunity for the Court to respond to the 
diverse harms suffered by individual victims and communities. This is in line with the practice 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. By contrast the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia explicitly limit reparations to collective and symbolic measures,89 given 
the millions of victims and reluctance of the Cambodian government to set up a complementary 
reparations body.90  The rest of this section discusses compensation and collective measures as 
the Court tries to navigate operational realities of reparations, where it is dealing with indigent 
perpetrators, the limited voluntary funds of the TFV and a multitude of victims. 
 
Compensation 
In terms of individual reparations, in particular in the form of compensation, there were 
conflicting views in the initial cases of the Court. In the Lubanga case the working presumption 
was that with the convicted person being indigent, compensation would be inappropriate,91 
despite victims’ wishes for such measure.92 The Trial Chamber erroneously did not set Mr 
Lubanga’s liability and was instead relying on the TFV to deliver some form of redress to 
victims at the discretion of its Board of Directors using its resources.93 The Appeals Chamber 
held that reparations must be ordered against a convicted person, but while compensation was 
acknowledged as a form of reparation, the Chamber considered that ‘determining the nature 
 
87Lubanga, supra note 26, para.222.  
88 Rule 97(1); and Lubanga, supra note 26, para.152. 
89 Rule 23(1)(b) and 23 quinquies(1). 
90 See Killean and Moffett, supra note 40. 
91 Relying on P. De Greiff and M. Wierda, ‘The Trust Fund for Victims of the ICC: Between Possibilities 
and Constraints,’ in M. Bossuyt, and others (ed.), Out of the Ashes. Reparations for Victims of Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations, Intersentia (2006), at 239; Lubanga, supra note 77, para.231; and 
Lubanga, supra note 29, para.67(ii). 
92 See Observations du groupe de victimes VO2 concernant la fixation de la peine et des réparations, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2869, 18 April 2012. 
93 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, 7 August 2012, paras.269-275. 
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and/or size of the reparation award is an appropriate task of the Trust Fund…’.94 The driving 
concern here seems to be the Court wanting to minimise community tension by awarding 
reparations to child soldiers from the Hema community, and not those they victimised, creating 
a hierarchy of victimhood.95 However, such a paternalistic approach undermines victims’ right 
to reparation before the ICC, by assuming the Chamber or the Trust Fund knows better what 
victims’ need.96 This was further compounded in the Ntaganda case, which adopted a ‘do no 
harm’ principle to avoid community tension and secondary victimisation, but this is too 
strongly influenced by humanitarian assistance where victims have needs, not rights.97 The 
Court also set-out the ‘no-over compensation’ principle to avoid double redress for Lubanga 
victims who were also in the Ntaganda case, but it strikes of a certain detachment from victims’ 
lived experiences that any reparations could ‘over’ compensate them.98 Yet this It also assumes 
that collective measures can be neutral or apolitical in societies where resources are scarce, 
communities continue to be vulnerable, face insecurity and experience everyday social violence 
with other communities years after the end of hostilities.99 In practice reparations may need to 
be individual anyway given ongoing insecurity and social distancing required by the pandemic. 
In the Katanga case the Trial Chamber was acutely aware that the majority of victims 
wanted compensation rather than collective measures.100 The victims’ legal representatives and 
defence had agreed to a €1 compensation amount as symbolic recognition of their suffering 
before the decision, as a way to focus more on psychological support for survivors.101 The 
Chamber found that the harm caused to the community amounted to $3.7 million, but given 
 
94 Lubanga, supra note 15, paras.202-203.  
95 See L. Moffett ‘Reparative complementarity: ensuring an effective remedy for victims in the reparation 
regime of the International Criminal Court’, IJHR 17(3)(2013)368-390, at 378. 
96  C. Ferstman, ‘Reparations at the ICC: The Need for a Human Rights Based Approach to 
Effectiveness,’ in C. Ferstman and M. Goetz (eds.), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, (2020), 446, at 459. 
97 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.50-51. 
98 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, para.220. 
99 M. Goetz, ‘Victims’ Experience of the International Criminal Court’s Reparations Mandate in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,’ in Ferstman and Goetz, ibid. 415. 
100 Registry, Report on applications for reparations in accordance with Trial Chamber II’s Order of 27 
August, 21 January 2015, ICC-01/04-01/07-3512-Anx1-Red2, para.49. 
101 Victims’ Proposals of 8 December 2016, ICC-01/04-01/07-3720, paras.18-19; Defence Response of 
30 December 2016, ICC-01/04-01/07-3722, paras.4-6. 
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that Katanga was convicted for aiding and abetting, he was only liable to $1 million. For victims 
this meant that despite the Court recognising they had suffered what would be valued between 
$2,000-$14,000 per individual victim, they would only be awarded $250. The Chamber 
justified the $250 amount as a way to provide a ‘personal and symbolic acknowledgement’ to 
victims and to regain their ‘self-sufficiency and to make decisions for themselves on the basis 
of their needs.’102  
Given how long these proceedings had taken and their inevitable cost, as well as 
victims’ loss, such a token amount may feel like an insult or cheapening of their suffering. 
Moreover, all victims were eligible for the symbolic award of $250 for moral harm, making no 
distinction between those who lost an immediate family member and those who lost minor 
material items. The Chamber held that this amount was ‘not intended as compensation for the 
harm in its entirety [...but] may provide some measure of relief for the harm suffered by the 
victims.’103 However this suggest that support would enable victims to become self-sufficient. 
Yet as most of the victims had lost a family member, witnessed horrendous atrocities and lost 
their homes and goods such an amount was seen as just virtue-signalling with some of the 
victims dying while waiting for more substantive redress including rehabilitation and 
educational support for their children.104  Nonetheless, even though the amount was small, 
victims in the Katanga case were able to invest the money, use it for their children’s education 
or pay off debts.105 
In Al Mahdi the Chamber limited compensation for moral harm to those individuals 
who exclusively relied on income from businesses they ran beside the destroyed mausoleums 
and those who were descendants of the saints. However it was difficult to establish who was a 
descendant as there was no clear kinship or documentation to this effect. Where there were 
documents, they related to the male descendants and not the female ones, which, if used, would 
 
102 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, para.285. 
103 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, para.300. 
104 Goetz, supra note 99, at 433. 
105 Goetz, ibid., at 442. 
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produce a gendered outcome. 106  In its draft implementation plan the TFV proposed that 
including female-based lines would increase the number of victims, but where these could not 
be identified, any remaining money would be placed into the fund for collective moral 
reparations.107 The Chamber approved the TFV approach to ensuring compensation was ‘real’ 
rather than symbolic, in providing comparable values based on similar awards in Malian law 
for cultural destruction and economic loss.108 Nevertheless, compensation has been an easier 
form of reparation to deliver to victims,109 compared to the collective measures in the first three 
cases of the ICC, where insecurity in Ituri and Mali inhibited more public-facing 
implementation. In a separate opinion in the Lubanga case, Judge Eboe-Osuji argued that 
individual reparations approach should be ‘exhausted...before restoring’ to collective 
reparations, suggesting that these issues are not settled.110 
 
Collective reparation 
In terms of collective measures, the Court has ordered a variety of measures influenced by 
context, the particular harm caused in the case and the views of the parties, and the TFV. In Al 
Mahdi, the Court recognised that ‘the number of victims and the scope of the consequential 
economic loss make a collective award more appropriate’,111 but it also recognised that certain 
individual victims were entitled to reparation. It indicated that collective reparation ‘should be 
aimed at rehabilitating the community of Timbuktu in order to address the economic harm 
caused.’112 Moreover, it suggested that the measures could include ‘raising programmes to 
promote Timbuktu’s important and unique cultural heritage, return/resettlement programmes, 
a ‘microcredit system’ that would assist the population to generate income, or other cash 
 
106 “Trust Fund for Victims’ submission of draft application form” ICC-01/12-01/15-289-Conf submitted 
on 26 October 2018, ICC-01/12-01/15-289-Red, 30 October 2018, paras.33-35. 
107 “Updated Implementation Plan”, submitted on 2 November 2018, ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Conf-Exp, 
ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red2, 22 November 2018, paras.54-55. 
108 Decision on the Updated Implementation Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-01/12-01/15-
324-Red, 4 March 2019, paras.26,31, 39 and 51-52. 
109 This is supported by practice in humanitarian assistance, see Goetz, supra note 99, at 443. 
110 ICC-01/04-01/06-3466-AnxI, 18 July 2019, para.7. 
111 Al Mahdi, supra note 18, para.82. 
112 Ibid., para.83. 
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assistance programmes to restore some of Timbuktu’s lost economic activity.’113 The TFV draft 
implementation plan also proposed an Economic Resilience Facility (ERF) to support economic 
initiatives proposed by members of the Timbuktu community. The ERF would be a microcredit 
centre to support cultural activities and the affected tourism industry,114 as well as creating a 
safe space for women and girls.115 
In Katanga the Trial Chamber ordered for victims of the Bogoro massacre collective 
measures that included housing assistance, education assistance, income-generating activities, 
and psychological rehabilitation.116  Notably, victims in Katanga rejected collective symbolic 
measures as unsuitable, pointless or with the potential to cause unrest.117 In the Al Mahdi case 
the victims rejected the TFV proposed symbolic measures of memorialisation, use of Mr Al 
Mahdi’s apology and a re-sanctification of the buildings, as inappropriate.118 Due to the ICC’s 
distance from affected community, such measures may feel too top-down on affected 
community and detract from the local meaning of redress. This reflects a fundamental contrast 
to transitional contexts where reparation claims are driven from below by victims, exhibiting 
their agency to articulate and shape measures to their needs. 119  Moreover, it reflects the 
frustration of victims with short-term, development or symbolic measures,120 when they expect 
substantive redress. In contrast in the Lubanga case collective reparations took the form of 
service based and symbolic measures - including construction of community centres and a 
mobile programme to reduce stigma and discrimination against former child soldiers, along 
with service-based collective measures such as physical and psychological rehabilitation, 
vocational training and income generating activities.  
Nearly nine years since the first Lubanga reparation order, the ICC approved the 
implementation plan of the TFV for collective reparations for services, with symbolic measures 
 
113 Al Mahdi, supra note 18, para.83. 
114 ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red2, para.120-137. 
115 Ibid. para.148-155. 
116 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, paras.302-304. 
117 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, para.301. See Bemba, experts report, 28 November 2017, ICC-01/05- 
01/08-3575-Conf, paras.207-211. 
118 ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red2, paras.157-167. 
119 See Luke Moffett, Reparations and Conflict: Repairing the Past after War, OUP (2022).  
120 Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, para.9 
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unable to be complemented by partners on the ground due to insecurity.121 One important 
development that although individual compensation was rejected for child soldiers due to risk 
of community tension, the reality that many of them are left physically or psychological 
disabled (or elderly indirect victims) they are unable to engage in collective measures of income 
generating, they have instead been given a ‘periodic subsistence payment’ or pension, which is 
effectively compensation in all but name.122 In the Ntaganda case the Court ordered ‘collective 
reparations with individualised components’, which included compensation, restitution, 
rehabilitation and satisfaction.123 It seems the Court in perpetuating the individual/collective 
division of reparations is tying itself in semantic knots to meet victims’ expectations against 
the limitations of the Court’s capacity and liability of the convicted person. Really the Court is 
slowly recognising that victims need to be dealt with through a collective administrative process 
rather than as individual judicial claims in the face of contexts that have a background of 
ongoing violence. The Court should recognise that collective/individual measures are not a 
dichotomy and focus on appropriate measures to remedy victims’ harm so that the process is 
more transparent and clearer for victims to understand. 
Collective reparations present further challenges in their operationalisation. For 
example, in the Katanga case the Chamber and the TFV have started to develop a flexible 
approach to maximising the benefits for victims. For instance, measures such as educational 
support may not be needed by some victims who do not have children, and so the Trust Fund 
allows concentrating their benefits on housing and/or income generating activities and vice-
versa where there are a number of children in a household.124 This method enables victims to 
apply their symbolic compensation awards to bolster collective measures, such as obtaining 
further housing benefits or a more valuable cow.125 This flexible approach is to be welcomed, 
as it recognises victims’ agency to shape reparations to their needs, rather than representing the 
 
121 ICC-01/04-01/06-3495. 
122 ICC-01/04-01/06-3495, para.146. 
123 ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras.191-208. 
124 ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, paras.102-104. 
125 Draft implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, 25 July 2017, para.102. 
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one-size fits all approach. Nevertheless, victims who are refugees in European countries or the 
US, will not be beneficiaries of collective reparations due to the increased cost involved for the 
TFV, which undermines victims’ rights for the sake of ease of service delivery.126  Moreover, 
in the face of ongoing violence victims may decide not to engage in housing benefits or spend 
their compensation for fear it will be wasted when they are displaced again. This speaks to the 
limits of the Court’s reparation mandate when it comes to guarantees of non-repetition. 
In human rights law combining individual and collective measures has been considered 
a key means to ensure an effective remedy of victims’ harm.127 Similarly domestic reparation 
programmes, such as in Peru and Colombia, individual measures and collective reparations are 
awarded.128 In these contexts the major challenge is effective implementation. In relation to 
compensation, in contrast with the restrictive approach applied so far by the ICC towards this 
form of reparation, regional human rights courts have most often awarded compensation for 
moral and pecuniary damages for victims of gross human rights violations and not in small 
numbers. There has been a similar experience in transitional justice practice where, although 
the amount awarded might not be as high as regional human rights courts, it remains higher 
than compensation paid so far by the ICC and is complemented with other measures.129 The 
tension between different forms of reparations has reflected in the operationalization of such 
measures by the Trust Fund. 
  
2. Operationalising reparations and the Trust Fund 
Delegates at the Rome Conference did not make a serious effort to work out how reparations 
would be implemented in practice, given that the Trust Fund was only supposed to operate as 
a repository of funds, rather than as an implementation body on the ground. As such, the TFV 
 
126 Victims in Uganda (17) will benefit from a similar programme, but compensation-in-kind could have 
been used to acknowledge this shortfall for 15 other victims. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red, 
paras.59-67. 
127 Massacre of Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Reparations, IACtHR, Series C 116, 19 November 2004; 
and Saramaka v. Suriname, paras.190-202. 
128  Congreso de la Republica, Peru, Ley que Crea el Plan Integral de Reparaciones (PIR), Ley 
28592/2005, Articles 6-7; and Congreso de la Republica, Colombia, Ley de Victimas y Restitucion de 
Tierras, Ley 448/2011, Articles 1, 3, 21 and 69. 
129 Ibid, and A/HRC/42/45, paras.29, 42, 44(c). 
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was envisaged with a dual mandate: its reparation mandate of using collected resources through 
fines or forfeitures of the convicted person as assets for reparations and supplementing them 
with any other funds;130 and its assistance mandate of providing ‘physical or psychological 
rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of victims and their families’.131 Despite this, 
the Trust Fund has become a key actor of the reparations process, exceeding any expectations 
created during the drafting process of the Rome Statute. Its role is necessary for the 
implementation and delivery of reparations to victims, so that it is separate from the Court, 
despite it often having an assistance mind-set and the legitimacy issues that this raises.132 
Moreover the Independent Experts Review (IER) found that the TFV has ‘ineffective 
oversight...absence of a fundraising strategy...significant budgetary underperformance, which 
combined with delays in the judicial process, eroded (potential) donors' confidence in the 
TFV.’133 These problems point to long-term problems in implementing reparations through the 
TFV. It is also grossly inefficient compared to other reparation implementation bodies, which 
normally have an administration running cost of 1-10% of total budget to maximise resources 
to victims,134 yet in 2019 the TFV operational costs were €2.8 million and only received €2.67 
million in voluntary donations reflecting 51%.135  
In the first decision on reparations in Lubanga the Trial Chamber held that the TFV 
was well placed, given its assistance programmes in the DRC, to determine appropriate forms 
of reparations and implement them.136 The Appeals Chamber overturned this delegation of 
reparation procedure to the TFV, requiring the Trial Chamber to monitor implementation, 
 
130 Regulation 44, TFV Regulations. 
131 Article 79(1); TFV Regulations 42 and 50(a)(i). 
132 See Regina E. Rauxloh, Good intentions and bad consequences: The general assistance mandate of 
the Trust Fund for Victims of the ICC, LJIL (2020) 34(1) 203-222. 
133  Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System, 
September 2020, para.890. 
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OUP 2006,235-242, at 240; and German Forced Labour Compensation Programme, MC/INF/248, 3 May 
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determine the harm victims’ suffered and the corresponding appropriate modalities of 
reparations.137 There have been tensions between the Chambers and the Trust Fund in working 
out who is responsible for identifying victims in implementing awards.138 In some part this 
tension is the result of the practical needs of the TFV to enable its work on the ground, which 
requires independence so as to not compromise its assistance mandate. Yet it has resulted in 
reparations at the ICC taking an overtly humanitarian composition. 
 The TFV has no experience in operating a reparation programme and it has only 
recently begun to implement reparations in the case of Lubanga.139 This means that most of its 
work of the Fund has been the implementation of assistance. The TFV believes that its 
assistance mandate does have a reparative dimension that distinguishes it from development 
and other humanitarian work. 140  However, the reparatory effect or impact of its policy 
programmes or other measures cannot be conflated with reparations. It is at best unclear, and 
at worst misrepresentation, how funding a radio programme on peace-building or community 
dialogue or a mobile book library in DRC or Uganda amounts to anything close to reparation 
for international crimes. This piecemeal approach might offer some basic support, but it is too 
ethereal to provide a meaningful remedy to victims’ suffering.  
This is apparent in the Lubanga case, where services, as forms of collective reparations, 
are directed at socio-economic programmes for child soldiers, such as vocational training, 
improving agricultural techniques, and micro-finance associations. 141  The TFV proposed 
conducting interviews and evaluations of victims to determine their interests in programmes, 
assess their literacy and numeracy skills, as well as providing them with relevant training to 
their chosen area, but it is questionable how transferrable these skills will be if their small 
business goes bankrupt. This speaks to the appropriateness of reparations addressing their harm, 
whether they missed years of school education and family support, in which a small business 
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investment is not going to be a long-term remedy.142 This goes to the heart of what the ICC can 
modestly do and should feasibly achieve as ‘reparation’ for victims before it. 
The focus on income generating activities is a reflection that victims have to be 
economically productive to get over their suffering. This might reduce the impetus on the State 
to make an effort to redress victims’ suffering, as they are left ‘self-responsible’ in mitigating 
their harm, and reduces such ‘reparations’ to more development.143 This language of ‘self-
sustaining’144 has been used by the Court to ensure that victims and their families can benefit 
in the long-term, but there is little evidence to suggest that such measures will be more than a 
short-term solution.145 Our own research in Nepal with child soldiers found that many such 
businesses that were set-up with training and investment became unprofitable after a couple of 
years forcing them to move to the capital or Gulf states for a more sustained income.146 While 
this may be down to poor planning and lack of long-term monitoring and follow-up, the TFV 
does not have the capacity to provide sustained support for victims, a problem that is 
exacerbated by the difficult conflict conditions in which the TFV is working. For example, 
consultations in Northern Mali as part of the reparations process in the Al Mahdi case, given on 
going conflict, were ‘a nearly impossible task to accomplish.’147 
Moreover the Trust Fund relies more on rehabilitation and reconciliation activities, 
based on its ability to fund organisations that can deliver large-scale benefits to a range of 
victims under its assistance mandate.148 This perhaps overstates the difference the TFV has 
made in individual lives. According to its 2018 report, 104,000 victims had directly benefited 
from its assistance mandate in the DRC and Uganda, and 350,000 family and community 
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members indirectly benefited over a ten-year period.149 Yet on average it only receives €3-4 
million annually, and between 2008-2016 it spent €12 million on assistance to victims.150 It is 
questionable what the tangible benefit is for all victims, whether it is long-term, and associated 
with the Court, or providing mixed messages.151 
Given the role of the TFV in implementing reparations, victims appear to move 
between having an entitlement enforceable by a Court, to being more of a victim-consultee.152 
Dixon suggests that without the Chambers being involved in monitoring implementation of any 
reparation plan, and providing a space for victims to challenge the measures adopted by the 
TFV, such measures may amount to ‘long-delayed assistance, stripped of the meaning that 
makes reparations powerful beyond their material value.’153 As Fisher points out, reparations 
have a two-fold function in providing practical means to alleviate victims’ harm, as well as an 
expressive or symbolic dimension that recognises their suffering and affirms their dignity, 
which is often absent in assistance.154 Nevertheless, the Court has tried to address this problem. 
For example, in the Al Mahdi case, the Court ordered that ‘victims know that it is aimed at 
repairing the harm suffered’ and that victims have to be involved in the design of collective 
reparations with the TFV.155 The Trust Fund in their subsequent implementation plan listened 
to victims in providing the most appropriate forms of reparations within its limited budget and 
capacity. Structural issues remain the sustainability of the current jurisprudence of the Court on 
reparations in the face of limited resources, ongoing violence and growing caseload. We may 
be expecting too much of the TFV which is allocating limited money from a bank account to 
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organisations on the ground in situations before the Court to redress victims’ harm. Ultimately 
there is a growing frustration amongst victims of the length reparations are taking at the Court, 
the convoluted disagreements and the ‘divergence’ of the TFV from victims’ preferences in 
operationalising such measures, which although separate is impacting on the legitimacy of the 
ICC.156 To the extent that the Independent Expert Report on the ICC reparation scheme finds it 
has ‘not delivered fair, adequate, effective and prompt reparations to victims of crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the Court.’157 
3. The future of reparations at the ICC 
The ICC is not the place to restore social justice or act as an administrative reparation 
programme for millions of victims. However, it has a reparation mandate that cannot be simply 
an afterthought. As Ferstman finds, the current Court’s approach to reparations is 
fundamentally problematic, as it lacks a ‘common vision about what successful reparations 
look like, and at best lukewarm commitment to doing what would be necessary to achieve 
anything beyond tokenism.’158 The growing unease with the current status quo of reparations 
in the Court signals the need for change. This has been exposed in light of the number of recent 
acquittals and termination of trials on a no-case basis.  
The final submission of the victims in the Bemba case makes for sober reading, after 
fifteen years waiting for reparations and justice at the ICC victims felt a ‘deep disappointment 
and hopelessness for not receiving justice…[leaving them] filled with scepticism and distrust 
towards the Court’159 with their expectations raised for redress, especially when engaged on 
reparations by the expert team.160 Their legal representatives wanted the Chamber to establish 
principles of victims’ harm that could be used to claim reparations before other legal fora;161 
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but the Chamber rejected this. In the acquittal appeal decision in the Bemba case, Judges van 
den Wyngaert and Morrison, while recognising that victims have a right to reparations, 
considered that the rights of defendants are at the heart of ICC proceedings,  
It is emphatically not the responsibility of the International Criminal Court to ensure 
compensation for all those who suffer harm as a result of international crimes. We do 
not have the mandate, let alone the capacity and the resources, to provide this to all 
potential victims in the cases and situations within our jurisdiction…[what we suggest] 
is that we stop viewing the International Criminal Court’s reparation procedures as 
(part of) a mechanism to restore social justice and to heal the wounds of societies that 
have been torn apart by aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. 
Only if we do that will it be possible to manage victims’ expectations and can we 
relieve International Criminal Court prosecutors and judges from potential pressure 
that is currently imposed upon them to secure convictions at all cost.162  
 
By contrast, in the Ruto and Sang case, where the Chamber terminated all trial proceedings 
against the accused, Judge Eboe-Osuji argued in his dissenting opinion that that the ICC should 
allow victims to voice their views and concerns, even though the case was terminated, as the 
Court can still make a decision on reparation principles.163 More recently, in the Al-Rahman 
(aka Al-Kushayb) case, the defendant, at the pre-trial stage, while affirming his innocence, 
expressed ‘regret’ that reparations for victims will be conditional on his conviction, with a long 
period for them to wait. Instead, he proposed alternative principles for reparations including for 
the Court and TFV to process reparations from the outset of a case.164  
Such cases and statements on Article 75(1) point to the need to have a fundamentally 
different procedure as well as a different institutional design to deal with reparations at the ICC. 
This would require an internal overhaul of the working of the ICC. The Court should aim to 
narrow the gap between the rhetoric or uninformed expectations of victims and the reality of 
reparations at the Court. We concur with Judge Eboe-Osuji who suggests that the reparation 
process should be ‘delinked’ from the criminal trial.165 As proposed in the filing of Mr Al-
Rahman a principled reparations order under Article 75(1) may offer this opportunity, as it does 
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not require an order to be made against an accused, but rather to determine the principles on 
scope and extent of damage, loss or injury and appropriate forms of reparations.166 Such an 
order as suggested by victims’ representatives in the Bemba case could be used before other 
forums or fundraised through donor voluntary contributions facilitated by a reformed TFV. A 
principled reparation order would provide official recognition of victims’ harm and a legal basis 
to seek redress through domestic courts. Acknowledgment is crucial to provide an opportunity 
for vindication of victims’ suffering and means-making in understanding of the impact of 
violence on themselves.167 However, symbolic reparations are not sufficient in themselves to 
provide a sense to victims that their harm mattered as much as the crime did, and to alleviate 
their suffering.  
We would argue that each Chamber involved in a case should have, right from the 
outset, a team working on victims’ participation and reparation alongside VPRS and people at 
the field office. The Court should also have a multidisciplinary team of experts on reparations 
in house to support the work of each Chamber and VPRS. Chambers should have a pool of 
experts such as a psychologist, a physician, an anthropologist, an economist, and a lawyer with 
practical expertise on victims’ consultation on harms and reparations, determining different 
types of harm (including collective), and identifying adequate forms of redress. The team 
should include at least one expert on gender violence, including sexual violence. The Court 
would then only appoint experts on reparation to address issues beyond in-house expertise.  
There is an urgent need to also look beyond the ICC and consider reparations in holistic 
terms, by strengthening domestic and international developments on redress and reparation 
mechanisms, rather than placing all expectations on a Court that will never be able to adequately 
deliver reparations.168 Facing this challenge requires a clear international commitment by States 
to ensure that reparations for victims of international crimes are a priority. The Assembly of 
States Parties offers an important political space to raise the level of the discussion on reparation 
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and to challenges States behaviour. So do other political spaces at the United Nations, for 
example, the Human Rights Council or the Security Council, as well as within regional 
international organisations such as the Organisation of American States, the African Union or 
the Council of Europe which can seek such principled reparation orders implemented.169  
 The serious implementation deficit facing human rights courts, societies transitioning 
from mass atrocities and the ICC, indicates that States’ commitment to reparation, and 
operationalisation are crucial to fulfil the right of victims to adequate, prompt and effective 
reparation. In the case of the ICC and the TFV, it is critical to consider how to create harmonic 
and reparative complementary mechanisms that work at the international, regional and national 
level to enable reparations and that prevent new harm of victims as a result of forum shopping 
or resentment across victims and communities.170  
In relation to considering reparations holistically, the ICC should use reparative 
complementarity to ensure that domestic systems not only respond with diligent criminal 
investigations but also with reparation for victims of such atrocious crimes.171 At the end of the 
day, the ICC will remain a Court of last resort and the bulk of the work on reparation should be 
done domestically and by other relevant actors, but greater coordination and vision is needed. 
Reparative complementarity in positive terms is a subsidiarity effort within States to end 
impunity by creating an effective remedy for victims to seek reparations for international 
crimes, thereby complementing reparations at the Court.172 Such an approach could avail of 
complementarity where victims could seek implementation before national, regional or other 
bodies for reparations. A reparative complementarity approach should be more closely 
examined by the Court in how reparations can be provided through domestic mechanisms to 
widen the benefits of any reparations ordered by the Court, but always in a manner that is 
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harmonic and consistent with international responses, and not one that would create further 
harm to victims by setting competing orders on reparation.173  
In light of the Dominic Ongwen conviction in February 2021 there may be an 
opportunity for reparative complementarity in Uganda, where the government released its 
transitional justice policy in June 2019, including a programme for reparations. Uganda has an 
experienced, knowledgeable, and organised civil society and victim groups that can 
substantively engage in the development and design of a reparation programme. The Court 
should encourage State Parties to take greater ownership in using reparations to end the 
pervading effects of impunity on victims and broaden out the benefits to all victims of 
international crimes, rather than just those before the ICC. The Court and the Assembly of State 
Parties should consider how they can add value to the transitional justice policy’s 
implementation on reparation in Uganda with the Ongwen case, building on the links the Field 
Office and the TFV have already developed there.174 This could be through donor support of 
the setting up of an administrative reparations body, funding, capacity building or delivering 
particular programmes such as identification documents for children born of war or recovery 
of the remains of those missing. This may tie in well with the work of other international 
organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has expertise in the 
forensic recovery of those missing in war.175 There are three concerns, however, that will 
continue to constrain the work of the Court in the years to come and where reflection is needed 
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Without adequate security on the ground, implementation of reparations is highly problematic. 
Insecurity has also been exacerbated since the COVID-19 pandemic began, making it even 
harder for the Court and the TFV to reach victims.176  Victims are in urgent need to receive 
prompt, adequate and effective redress, which the pandemic has only compounded as many are 
unable to support themselves through livelihoods income, access healthcare (due to shielding 
for underlying health problems) or at risk from increased domestic and sexual violence from 
being confined at home. Virtual or phone contact with victims or radio broadcasts are still 
possible, but some victims are unlikely to have access to direct communication with 
intermediaries or the Court through such means. These problems will be a persistent issue in 
situations facing insecurity and fragility like those in Libya, Burundi, the Central African 
Republic II, and Darfur for example. This, bearing in mind reparative complementarity, may 
require creating better local and international networks with civil society and inter-
governmental organisations to increase the reach to victims, but also in terms of delivery of 
reparations through such bodies where the State or the TFV are unable or unwilling to do so 
during ongoing insecurity. Victims can be displaced across borders or internally making their 
tracing over numerous spates of violence difficult, but measures could be put in place to ensure 
more direct provision of reparations to victims, such as mobile phone cash transfers.177 
 
Funding 
Given that all convicted persons by the Court so far have been declared indigent, a key 
challenge is how to secure the financial resources to implement the various forms of reparation, 
individual and collective, that are ordered by the Court. Voluntary contributions to the Trust 
Fund do not make viable the reparation mandate of the Court, among other reasons because 
reparation should not depend on the will of States or other actors to contribute to redress but 
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also because, as Mégret suggests, this is in part a problem of demand and supply.178 It should 
be a process through which reparation is provided bearing in mind that redress should aim to 
wipe out the harms caused to the victims by the convicted person. As the Trust Fund has 
indicated, its funds ‘have already run short of even complementing all of the existing three 
reparations orders where the convicted persons were found indigent, totalling close to 15 
million US dollars.’179 The Court has been funded over €1.7 billion between 2005-2021, but 
only secured five convictions for international crimes.180 Most of this money is for institutional 
and staff costs, with very little support reaching victims.181 A possible response to the lack of 
voluntary contributions could be that the Assembly of State Parties consider creating a 
dedicated budget line for reparations in future budgets of the Court, creating more certainty and 




Ordering reparations by a court that is based in the Hague with the aim of making them 
operational, is no small challenge. The Court needs a very clear understanding of the situation 
on the ground, the harms caused to victims, the cultural, religious and political features of the 
context and of the victims, as well as a well-grounded appreciation of what is possible in such 
situations and with those victims. Implementation can be helped by experts on reparation 
appointed by the Court as occurred in Al Mahdi, Bemba and Ntaganda, but it needs to be more 
sustainable and enable the ICC to develop its own institutional expertise. However, the Trust 
Fund has faced challenges in terms of implementation in terms of the ‘significant increase in 
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workload, TFV Fund to directly deliver reparations awards; complexity induced by legal 
proceedings and contextual challenges; intense collaborative working relationships [with 
diverse actors] and […] the need to intensify and diversity resource mobilization.’182  How the 
TFV and the Court can operationalize and monitor compliance with reparations on the ground 
is one of the key questions.  
One solution may be to reorient the assistance mandate to be interim relief, in that it 
would be targeted to those victims in a case, rather than a situation. This would help to focus 
redress on those victim before the Court, enabling harm to be mitigated at an earlier stage, 
instead of only after a conviction. This would not impact upon the rights of the accused, as 
victims’ rights to assistance and reparations are autonomous of any responsible individual being 
identified, prosecuted or convicted. 183  While arguably this blurs the line between 
assistance/reparations and victims of the situation/case, it ultimately is an issue for judges to 
discern that receipt of interim relief does not go to the guilt of the accused person. Judges in 
domestic jurisdictions often can separate such issues, given the different burdens of proof in 
civil and criminal cases. It seems incongruous that judges of the ICC as legal professionals 
cannot do the same. 
4. Conclusion 
Reparations for international crimes are intended to respond to the harm suffered by victims. 
While the inclusion of reparations in the Rome Statute of the ICC was intended to offer more 
victim-centred justice within an international criminal body, it is confined within the criminal 
justice paradigm. For example, when considering the scope of liability of the convicted person, 
or when deciding if victims can still participate or apply for reparation at the ICC. Nevertheless, 
in contrast to ten years ago where the Court has no reparation decisions, today despite a very 
late start, the picture of reparations at the ICC is becoming clearer. The Court has identified 
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key substantive and procedural principles and others will continue to emerge, with six new ones 
being endorsed in the Ntaganda case. Judges have played a key role in experimenting and 
blending different legal principles and practices to make reparations work at the Court. They 
all denote a clear tendency at the ICC, as far as that is appropriate, to adopt international 
standards on reparation. However, major challenges persist.  
We need to consider how to measure the success of the ICC reparations mandate in the 
future. This will require going beyond current developments of the Court. First, the Court 
should consider if its current architecture is adequate to implement its reparation mandate. As 
suggested in this article, the ICC should strengthen each Chamber responsible for a case by 
having dedicated experts on victims’ participation and reparation, working alongside VPRS 
and the TFV. Field offices should also require more funding and staffing to better capture data 
on victims harm and their views and concerns on reparations. In addition a multidisciplinary 
pool of experts on victims’ participation and reparation should be created within the Court to 
assist Chambers and VPRS.  
Second, the Court needs to strike a better balance between the rights of the accused and 
those of victims. This requires thinking of integrating reparations at the start of situations, from 
early investigations into assets of suspects to be frozen, as well as informing victims of the 
likelihood of reparations at the Court, their scope and comparable timeframe in other cases. 
This will allow victims to make more informed choices on whether or not to seek reparation 
before the Court and to consider opportunities for redress elsewhere. A principled reparations 
order provides a good basis to position reparations from the outset of the case, rather than the 
end, which could help inform interim relief measures.   
Third, the Court needs to carry out its work as part of a landscape of international and 
domestic responses to reparation for victims and engage, in this sense, in reparative 
complementarity, particularly given the lack of resources and its narrow mandate. The ICC has 
limited capacity to deliver redress that is going to appear symbolic and a dilution of victims’ 
rights. Reparations are a complex and costly issue, which require long-term commitment by the 
State to adequately resolve. It cannot be a top-down, external exercise, if it going to be 
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sustainable in the long-term. The Court and the TFV need to consider how, when and with 
whom to operationalize reparations as ordered by the Court in the very difficult contexts they 
are dealing with, and as a consequence, they also need to consider how to monitor and measure 
compliance with this complex mandate.  
These are issues that should have been raised twenty years ago, but some lessons are 
being slowly learned and the awareness and importance of the right to reparations of victims is 
increasingly becoming centre-stage. Decisive collective action is needed to make reparation a 
reality. The ICC is just one element on that process, but a very important one given the visibility 
it gives to crimes and victims. Otherwise, if we continue with the current arrangement of trying 
to tilt at windmills and not realistically implement reparations, victims will seek redress 
elsewhere. So, rather than having competing bodies ordering reparations worldwide, such 
bodies, should engage in better coordination and dynamics of dignification and reparation for 
victims. The ICC can play a pivotal role in ensuring that all of these bodies work as a system 
through principled orders. 
The ICC is often the only justice actor in situations of ongoing conflict; conducting 
trials is not enough to end impunity. The ICC was established to end impunity for international 
crimes and deliver justice for victims, of which reparations are a key part. Reparations at the 
ICC should not be an afterthought of the trial, or a rhetorical exercise to legitimise the Court’s 
existence, nor should it be dismissed as quixotic or an enemy of the Court’s core work. We 
need to recognise that the failure to include reparations at the ad hoc tribunals, curtailed its 
legitimacy amongst affected communities. More than twenty years on from the adoption of the 
Rome Statute, we should rethink how to better implement reparations on the ground in domestic 
programmes and at the Court, so that it is not an international project enriching only lawyers in 
the Hague, but alleviating the suffering of those bearing the consequences of such atrocities.  
 
 
